Most of the articles about insider trading assume that there is only one risky asset in the market. On the basis of these papers, this thesis is mainly divided into three parts to study the situation of multiple risky assets in the market. In the first part, the situation of multiple risky assets in the market when two transactions are in progress is studied and then, the equilibrium when the market requires the internal traders to disclose the trading volume after each transaction is analyzed. In the second part, the equilibrium of multi-period based on the two phases of transaction is derived. The third part is the summary of the paper.
Introduction
In modern finance mathematics, many models assume that all investors in the market have the same information and the same expectation. However, in real financial market or spot market, information asymmetry is common, such as the securities market. Traders with private information may release their own information at the beginning of the transaction, or they may conceal private information by adjusting their strategies. In 1985, Kyle [1] published a paper that analyzed the situation when there was only one risk-neutral internal trader. The results showed that the informed trader revealed his information at a constant rate when trading in continuous time. Based on this article, Holden and Subrahmanyam [2] [3] gave a model in which there are more than two informed traders and analyzed the impact of the number of insider traders to the market, with the result that their information was revealed almost immediately and the market depth is infinite. In addition, many experts have done further work on X X X P  becomes Nash equilibrium [7] , if all { } 
Transaction Required to Announce Trading Volume
Lemma: Let 1 X , 2 X be two normal random vectors,
We assume that the trading volume of internal traders is disclosed (but not verified afterwards) before the second trading begins after the end of the first trading, then the above price and trading strategy are not balanced under the new framework [8] . Assuming that the market maker guesses that each internal trader's strategy for j-th asset in the first period is 1 Obviously, any reversible strategy can not be an equilibrium strategy. We assume that the first stage strategy of an internal trader consists of two parts, one is the part that can be predicted with the information available to him, the other is ( ) 
where ( )
Next is the maximization of the solution. We record the largest 
The two order derivation is 
The Optimization Problem of the First Phase
Next, we study the optimization problem of the first phase.
( ) ( ) 
From the second-order condition we can obtain that
If our hypothetical mixed trading strategy holds in equilibrium, i.e.
( )
then from the Formula (1.2.5) we can obtain that 1 
From the conditions of market effectiveness, we can get ( )
In conjunction with lemma , we can obtain that 1) 
The eleventh formula can be reduced to In conclusion, we can get the following propositions.
Proposition: When the market requires the internal trader to announce the trading volume, the sub-game equilibrium has uniqueness. In this equilibrium, there are constants 1 [10] ( )
For all internal traders. constants 1 
Multi Period Transactions
We generalize the two-period results to the multi-period case, assuming that there is a total N-period transaction, the traders announce his trading volume after the end of each transaction. Transaction prices reflect the volume of transactions in the past and present.
First, the following proposition is given based on the two phase result.
Proposition In the market where M insiders exist, there is a unique subgame Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there are constants Proof: By using backward induction, the optimal problem of the period N of a trader i for given ( ) 
x : the average value of other traders' transactions on asset j.
The first order derivative can be obtained for the upper form.
, we can find out ( ) ( ) 
The first derivative of the upper form is 
